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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Anthony Elonis was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 
875(c), which prohibits transmitting in interstate commerce a 
communication containing a threat to injure the person of 
another.  We affirmed his conviction on appeal, but the 
Supreme Court reversed our judgment.  It held that the jury 
instruction regarding Elonis’s mental state was insufficient 
and therefore erroneous.  On remand, we will once again 




 In May 2010, Elonis’s wife left him, moved out of 
their home, and took their two children with her.  Shortly 
thereafter Elonis began having problems at work.  He was an 
operations supervisor and communications technician at 
Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom amusement park. His 
supervisors observed him with his head down on his desk 
crying, and he was sent home on several occasions because he 
was too upset to work.   
 
 One of the employees Elonis supervised, Amber 
Morrissey, made five sexual harassment reports against him.  
According to Morrissey, on one occasion Elonis came into 
her office late at night and began to undress in front of her.  
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She left after he removed his shirt.  Morrissey also reported 
another incident in which Elonis made an employee who was 
a minor female uncomfortable when he placed himself close 
to her and told her to stick out her tongue. 
 
 Elonis’s problems came to a head on October 17, 
2010, when he posted a photograph from a Halloween event 
at the park to his Facebook page, showing him holding a 
knife to Morrissey’s neck.  He added the caption “I wish” 
under the photo.  When his supervisor saw the Facebook post, 
Elonis was fired. 
 
 Two days later, on October 19, Elonis posted another 
violent statement to his Facebook page.  He wrote: 
 
Someone once told me that I was a firecracker.  
Nah.  I’m a nuclear bomb and Dorney Park just 
f***ed with the timer.  If I was the general 
manager, I’d be on the phone with Sandusky1 
discussing a damage control plan.  But I’m not 
and y’all haven’t heard the last of Anthony 
Elonis. 
This post raised concern among Elonis’s coworkers, who 
followed him on Facebook.  They voiced their concern in 
Facebook posts of their own.  One post stated, “I hope that 
Dan Hall [chief of patrol at Dorney Park] is aware that 
security needs to be looking out for him . . . ,”  and another 
expressed fear that Elonis would “hurt or kill” someone.  
                                              




Elonis was aware of these fears.  He admitted at trial that he 
had saved screenshots of the posts on his computer. 
 
The fear among Dorney Park employees was not 
limited to these Facebook posts.  Hall, the chief of patrol, 
testified at trial that he took steps to enhance park security 
and informed local police and the FBI of Elonis’s statements.  
Morrissey testified that she had chosen a hiding place in case 
Elonis ever came back to Dorney Park. 
 
 Despite his knowledge that his violent post had scared 
coworkers, Elonis posted another violent message two days 
after viewing his coworkers’ exchanges.  He wrote: 
 
Moles.  Didn’t I tell ya’ll I had several? Ya’ll 
saying I had access to keys for the f***ing 
gates, that I have sinister plans for all my 
friends and must have taken home a couple.  
Ya’ll think it’s too dark and foggy to secure 
your facility from a man as mad as me.  You 
see, even without a paycheck I’m still the main 
attraction. Whoever thought the Halloween 
haunt could be so f***ing scary? 
This post became the basis for Count One of Elonis’s 
indictment, threatening park patrons and employees.  He was 
acquitted of the charges in this count. 
 
 Around the same time, Elonis began posting crude, 
degrading, and violent material to his Facebook page about 
his (soon-to-be former) wife.  One post states, “If I only knew 
then what I know now, I would have smothered your ass with 
a pillow, dumped your body in the back seat, dropped you off 
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in Toad Creek,2 and made it look like a rape and murder.”  
Another post was in response to a status update posted to 
Facebook by Elonis’s sister-in-law.  Her status update read, 
“Halloween costume shopping with my niece and nephew 
should be interesting.”  Elonis commented on this status, 
writing, “Tell [their son] he should dress up as matricide for 
Halloween.  I don’t know what his costume would entail 
though.  Maybe [his mother’s] head on a stick?”  Elonis also 
posted in October 2010: 
 
There’s one way to love you but a thousand 
ways to kill you.  I’m not going to rest until 
your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying 
from all the little cuts.  Hurry up and die, 
b****, so I can bust this nut all over your 
corpse from atop your shallow grave.  I used to 
be a nice guy but then you became a slut.  
Guess it’s not your fault you liked your daddy 
raped you.  So hurry up and die, b****, so I 
can forgive you. 
At trial, Elonis’s wife testified that her husband’s posts “made 
[her] extremely afraid for [her] life.”  The posts made her feel 
“like [she] was being stalked,” and made her feel “extremely 
afraid for [her] and [her] children’s and [her] families’ lives.”  
She sought a Protection From Abuse order—essentially, a 
restraining order—against Elonis in state court.  Elonis 
attended the proceeding at which the court issued the 
restraining order on November 4, 2010. 
 
                                              
2 Toad Creek runs behind Elonis’s father-in-law’s house, 
where Elonis’s wife was living at the time of the post. 
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 The issuance of the restraining order did not stop 
Elonis’s violent rhetoric.  On November 7, 2010, he posted an 
adaptation of a stand-up comedy routine to his Facebook.  In 
the actual routine, a comedian explains that it is illegal for a 
person to say he wishes to kill the President, but not illegal to 
explain that it is illegal for him to say that.  Elonis’s version 
substituted his wife for the President:  
Hi, I’m Tone Elonis. 
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I 
want to kill my wife? . . . 
It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not 
allowed to say. . . . 
Now it was okay for me to say it right then 
because I was just telling you that it’s illegal 
for me to say I want to kill my wife. . . . 
Um, but what’s interesting is that it’s very 
illegal to say I really, really think someone out 
there should kill my wife. . . . 
But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher. 
Because that’s its own sentence. . . . 
I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, 
extremely illegal to go on Facebook and say 
something like the best place to fire a mortar 
launcher at her house would be from the 
cornfield behind it because of easy access to a 
getaway road and you’d have a clear line of 
sight through the sun    room. . . . 
Yet even more illegal to show an illustrated 
diagram. 
[diagram of the house]. . . . 
The diagram of the home was accurate.  At the end of the 
post, Elonis linked to a YouTube video of the original stand-
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up routine, writing, “Art is about pushing limits.  I’m willing 
to go to jail for my Constitutional rights.  Are you?”  
 
 This was not the last violent remark Elonis made about 
his wife on his Facebook page.  On November 15, referencing 
the Protection From Abuse order, Elonis wrote: 
 
Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket 
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? 
Try to enforce an Order 
That was improperly granted in the first place 
Me thinks the judge needs an education on true 
threat jurisprudence 
And prison time will add zeros to my settlement 
Which you won’t see a lick 
Because you suck dog d*** in front of the 
children . . .  
And if worse comes to worse 
I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the 
state police and Sheriff’s Department. 
These posts formed the basis of Count Two of Elonis’s 
indictment, threatening his wife.  The reference to the police 
at the bottom of the November 15 post formed the basis of 
Count Three of his indictment, threatening law enforcement 
officers. 
 
 The next day, November 16, Elonis escalated his 
violent rhetoric to include elementary schools: 
 
That’s it, I’ve had about enough 




Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius 
to initiate the most heinous school shooting 
ever imagined 
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a 
kindergarten class 
The only question is . . . which one? 
This post formed the basis of Count Four of Elonis’s 
indictment. 
 
 By this point, the FBI was monitoring Elonis’s 
Facebook posts, because Dorney Park had contacted the FBI 
regarding Elonis’s violent rhetoric against Dorney Park and 
its employees.  The threat to initiate a school shooting 
prompted the FBI to visit Elonis at his house on November 
30.  Elonis did not cooperate with the agents who attempted 
to interview him.  Later that day, he posted: 
 
You know your s***’s ridiculous when you 
have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door 
Little Agent Lady stood so close 
Took all the strength I had not to turn the b*** 
ghost 
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her 
throat 
Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms 
of her partner 
[laughter] 
So the next time you knock, you best be 
serving a warrant 
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert 
while you’re at it 
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Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ 
a bomb 
Why do you think it took me so long to get 
dressed with no shoes on? 
I was jus’ waitin’ for ya’ll to handcuff me and 
pat me down 
Touch the detonator on my pocket and we’re 
all goin’ 
[BOOM!] 
Are all the pieces comin’ together? 
S***, I’m a crazy sociopath 
that gets off playin’ you stupid f***s like a 
fiddle 
And if y’all didn’t hear, I’m gonna be famous 
Cause I’m just an aspiring rapper who likes the 
attention 
who happens to be under investigation for 
terrorism 
cause y’all think I’m ready to turn the Valley 
into Fallujah 
But I ain’t gonna tell you which bridge is 
gonna fall into which river or road 
And if you really believe this s*** 
I’ll have some bridge rubble to see you 
tomorrow 
[BOOM!][BOOM!][BOOM!] 






 Elonis was arrested on December 8, 2010, and charged 
with transmitting in interstate commerce communications 
containing a threat to injure the person of another in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  Following his indictment, he moved to 
dismiss all five counts, contending his speech was protected 
by the First Amendment.  The District Court denied his 
motion and his case proceeded to trial. 
 
 Elonis testified in his own defense at trial.  He claimed 
he did not intend to make any threats, and would never act 
violently.  He testified, “These were—these were lyrics.  
These—these were for entertainment purposes only.  They 
weren’t intended for anyone to feel like I was threatening 
them or feel scared.  I didn’t want anyone to feel scared.”  
When asked how he thought people might interpret his posts, 
Elonis responded, “You know, I didn’t really care what other 
people thought.”  He further testified, “I made an on-line 
persona and I figured the worse I made myself seem, you 
know, I didn’t care what people said about me.” 
 
 Applying circuit precedent, the District Court 
instructed the jury that 
 
a statement is a true threat when a defendant 
intentionally makes a statement in a context or 
under such circumstances wherein a reasonable 
person would foresee that the statement would 
be interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of an intention to inflict bodily 
injury or take the life of an individual. 
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The government’s closing argument emphasized that it was 
irrelevant whether Elonis intended the postings to be threats, 
saying: 
 
Even if you were to believe absolutely 
everything that he said to you today, it has 
absolutely no[] impact on whether or not you 
should find him guilty or not. . . . Again, it 
doesn’t matter what he thinks.   
The jury convicted Elonis on Counts Two through 
Five of his indictment, acquitting him only of Count One, 
threatening park patrons and employees.  He was sentenced to 
forty-four months’ imprisonment. 
 
 On appeal, Elonis argued that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), requires a 
jury to find that a defendant subjectively intended his 
statements to be understood as threats for them to fall under 
the true-threat exception to the First Amendment.  Applying 
circuit precedent, we upheld his conviction.3 
                                              
3 Except for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, see 
United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631–32 (9th 
Cir. 2005), our opinion conformed to the general agreement at 
the time among other sister circuits that an objectively 
threatening communication falls into the true-threat exception 
to the First Amendment, see, e.g., United States v. White, 670 
F.3d 498, 510 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases), abrogated by 
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  None have 
had a chance to reconsider in light of the Supreme Court’s 




 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.  
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  The Court 
did not reach the First Amendment issues presented by the 
case.  Instead, it based its ruling on its interpretation of the 
statute under which Elonis was convicted, Section 875(c).  
Reasoning that “[f]ederal criminal liability generally does not 
turn solely on the results of an act without considering the 
defendant’s mental state,” the Court rejected the objective 
standard under which the jury was instructed.  Id. at 2012.  
While the Court added that in this case, there was no dispute 
that a knowledge or purpose standard would satisfy Section 
875(c)’s mental state requirement, it declined to address 
whether a recklessness standard would be sufficient.  Id.  
Accordingly, it reversed our judgment and remanded the case 
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
 
 Justice Alito concurred in part and dissented in part 
from the majority’s opinion.  He would have decided the 
recklessness issue and held that a recklessness standard 
satisfies Section 875(c)’s mental state requirement.  Id. at 
2016 (Alito, J., concurring).  He also suggested that on 
remand we “consider whether [Elonis’s] conviction can be 





The jury at Elonis’s trial was instructed it could 
convict him under Section 875(c) if it found that “a 
reasonable person in [his] position” would have “foreseen 
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that the communication he made would have been interpreted 
by the recipient as a serious expression of an intention to 
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.”  The 
Supreme Court held this instruction was insufficient and 
therefore erroneous, because “negligence is not sufficient to 
support a conviction under Section 875(c).”  Elonis, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2013.  Instead, the Court explained, the jury should 
have been instructed it could convict Elonis if it found he 
“transmit[ted] a communication for the purpose of issuing a 
threat, or with knowledge that the communication w[ould] be 
viewed as a threat.”  Id. at 2012.  The Court left open the 
question of whether an instruction on a standard of 
recklessness would be sufficient under Section 875(c) or 
under the First Amendment. 
 
We believe Section 875(c) contains both a subjective 
and objective component, and the Government must satisfy 
both in order to convict a defendant under the statute.  The 
Supreme Court focused on the subjective component.  It held 
that to satisfy the subjective component of Section 875(c), the 
Government must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant transmitted a communication for the 
purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the 
communication would be viewed as a threat.4 
 
The Government must also satisfy the objective 
component, which requires it to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant transmitted a communication that a 
                                              
4 As noted, the Court did not address whether a finding of 
recklessness would be sufficient. 
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reasonable person would view as a threat.5  The objective 
component of Section 875(c) shields individuals from 
culpability for communications that are not threatening to a 
reasonable person, distinguishing true threats from hyperbole, 
satire, or humor.  See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 
708 (1969).  It requires the jury to consider the context and 
circumstances in which a communication was made to 
determine whether a reasonable person would consider the 
communication to be a serious expression of an intent to 
inflict bodily injury on an individual.  See Virginia v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).6 
 
While it is clear that a defendant can be convicted 
under Section 875(c) for transmitting an objectively 
threatening communication “with knowledge that the 
communication will be viewed as a threat,” Elonis and the 
Government disagree on the application of that standard.  
Elonis contends the Government must show the defendant 
“acted with knowledge of a reasonable person’s 
                                              
5 The District Court’s instruction in this case properly states 
the objective component.   
6 We recognize that, in addition to this objective component, 
the Ninth Circuit requires proof of a specific intent to threaten 
to satisfy the First Amendment.  See Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 
at 1118.  But see United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 485 
(6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., dubitante) (explaining that as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, Section 875(c) requires a 
subjective component, but “as a matter of constitutional 
avoidance . . . threat prohibitions like [Section 875(c)] cover 
only ‘real’ threats, threats in other words that a reasonable 
observer would take as true and real”), abrogated by Elonis, 
135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
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interpretation of the speech as threatening,” reasoning that 
“knowledge that particular persons would consider the 
communications threatening is not necessarily equivalent to 
knowledge of how a reasonable person would understand 
them.”  Were this not the standard, Elonis argues, a defendant 
could violate Section 875(c) merely by “post[ing] photos of 
his pit bull on Facebook . . . knowing that some members of 
the Facebook community unreasonably found photos of such 
dogs threatening . . . .” 
 
Elonis’s concerns are unfounded.  The objective 
component of Section 875(c) ensures that a defendant can 
only be convicted for transmitting communications that are 
objectively threatening.  Moreover, his approach would 
render the objective component meaningless.  Instead of 
asking the jury whether the defendant’s communication was 
objectively threatening, Elonis would ask only whether the 
defendant believed his communication was objectively 
threatening.  But it is not for the defendant to determine 
whether a communication is objectively threatening—that is 
the jury’s role.  If a defendant transmits a communication for 
the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the 
recipient7 will view it as a threat, and a jury determines that 
                                              
7 We recognize it may sometimes be difficult to pinpoint the 
recipient of the communication.  This is especially so in the 
age of social media, when the recipient of the communication 
may be a defendant’s Facebook followers or even the general 
public.  But Section 875(c) operates the same whether the 
communication has one recipient or many.  For example, if a 
defendant transmits a communication on Facebook, he 
violates Section 875(c) if the communication is objectively 
threatening and the defendant transmitted it for the purpose of 
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communication is objectively threatening, then the defendant 
has violated Section 875(c) whether or not he agrees the 
communication was objectively threatening. 
 
With this understanding of Section 875(c) in mind, we 
will turn to Elonis’s trial to determine whether the error at his 
trial was harmless. 
 
B. 
 For a trial error to be harmless, we must “conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have 
been the same absent the error.”  Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 19 (1999).  Our inquiry “is not whether, in a trial that 
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have 
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.”  
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).  When the 
error involves a mens rea instruction, “[a] verdict may still 
stand, despite erroneous jury instructions, where the predicate 
facts ‘conclusively establish [mens rea], so that no rational 
jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant 
criminal act’” without also finding the requisite mens rea.  
Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 260 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580–81 (1986)).8 
                                                                                                     
issuing a threat or with knowledge that it would be viewed as 
a threat by his Facebook followers. 
8 In Whitney, the jury was improperly instructed regarding the 
element of intent in a first-degree murder case.  We found 
that, due to the strong circumstantial evidence of intent within 




Elonis was convicted on four counts of violating 18 
U.S.C. § 875(c), which prohibits “transmit[ting] in interstate 
or foreign commerce any communication containing any 
threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person 
of another . . . .”  The jury was erroneously instructed under 
an objective standard.  The parties dispute whether a 
recklessness standard or a knowledge standard is sufficient.  
But under either standard, we find the District Court’s error 
was harmless.  The record contains overwhelming evidence 
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that Elonis knew 
the threatening nature of his communications, and therefore 
would have been convicted absent the error. 
 
1. 
 Count Two of the indictment charged Elonis with 
violating Section 875(c) by communicating a threat to injure 
his ex-wife.  The jury convicted Elonis on this count under an 
objective standard, finding that the Facebook posts about his 
ex-wife would be regarded as threatening by a reasonable 
person.  A review of the evidence surrounding these posts 
unequivocally demonstrates the jury would have convicted 
Elonis were it required to find that he either knew his ex-wife 
would feel threatened by the posts or that he purposely 
threatened her. 
 
 In October 2010, just five months after Elonis’s wife 
left him, Elonis posted three messages to Facebook that 
referenced, among other things, his desire to rape her, kill her, 
                                                                                                     
about whether Whitney . . . form[ed] the intent to kill.”  280 
F.3d at 261. 
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put her head on a stick, and “bust this nut all over [her] 
corpse.”  Following these posts, Elonis’s wife sought a 
restraining order against him.  Elonis attended the proceeding 
at which the order was issued, on November 4, 2010.  Despite 
knowing his wife felt threatened enough to seek a restraining 
order against him, Elonis continued his violent rhetoric with 
his November 7 post expressing, once again, his desire to kill 
his ex-wife.  Just eight days later, he again posted a violent 
message about his ex-wife that explicitly referenced the 
restraining order she had obtained and asked whether it was 
thick enough to stop a bullet. 
 Elonis contends the jury may have acquitted him had it 
not been instructed on an incorrect objective standard.  
According to Elonis, these errors “rendered irrelevant” his 
testimony regarding his mental state at the time he posted the 
messages to Facebook.  But as Elonis concedes, Section 
875(c)’s mental state requirement can be met with proof of 
purpose or knowledge.  His testimony at trial focused on his 
purpose of his Facebook posts, but never contested that he 
knew his posts would be viewed as threats.9  Thus, even if the 
jury believed Elonis’s testimony, it could still have found that 
he knew the threatening nature of his posts. 
 
 Moreover, even if Elonis had testified he did not know 
his ex-wife would feel threatened, “harmless-error cases do 
not turn on whether the defendant conceded the factual issue 
                                              
9 For example, Elonis testified his posts “weren’t intended for 
anyone to feel like I was threatening them or feel scared.” He 
further testified, “I’m not trying to threaten anyone.” These 
statements offer his explanation for the purpose of his posts, 
but do not address whether he knew his ex-wife would feel 
threatened by them.   
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on which the error bore.”  Rose, 478 U.S. at 583.  “[T]he fact 
that [Elonis] denied that he had [the requisite mens rea] does 
not dispose of the harmless-error question.”  Id. at 583–84.  
Instead, harmless error review “mandates consideration of the 
entire record” to determine whether the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id at 583. 
 
Reviewing the whole record, we find that even if 
Elonis had contested the knowledge element in his testimony, 
no rational juror would have believed him.  Considering the 
graphic nature of the three messages Elonis posted in 
October, it is not at all credible that Elonis did not know his 
ex-wife would interpret them as threats.  But it is less credible 
still that, having attended the court proceeding at which she 
sought a restraining order against him, Elonis remained 
unaware of his ex-wife’s fears as he posted more violent 
messages on November 7 and 15.  The evidence 
overwhelmingly shows that Elonis posted those two messages 
with either the purpose of threatening his ex-wife, or with 
knowledge that she would interpret the posts as threats.  No 
rational juror could conclude otherwise. 
 
2. 
 Count Three of the indictment charged Elonis with 
violating Section 875(c) by communicating a threat to injure 
employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and Berks County 
Sheriff’s Department.  Just as with Count Two, the jury 
convicted Elonis of this Count under an objective standard, 
finding that the Facebook post about the police would be 




 Elonis’s post regarding the police came at the end of 
his November 15 post about his ex-wife.  It stated, “And if 
worse comes to worse / I’ve got enough explosives to take 
care of the state police and Sheriff’s Department.”  Elonis 
advances several arguments for why the jury would not have 
convicted him had it been instructed under a knowledge 
standard. 
 
First, he contends again that the objective standard 
prevented the jury from considering his testimony that he did 
not know his posts would be regarded as threatening.  This 
argument fails for the same reasons as above.  Contrary to his 
suggestion, Elonis never testified that he was unaware of the 
threatening nature of his posts referencing the State Police 
and the Sheriff’s Department.  Elonis knew that both his 
coworkers and his ex-wife felt threatened by the violent 
rhetoric in his previous Facebook posts.  Despite that, he 
posted yet another violent message stating his intention to 
detonate explosives near State Police officers and the 
Sheriff’s Department if “worse comes to worse.” If anything, 
this post is a more explicit threat than those that he knew had 
frightened his coworkers and ex-wife.  It is difficult to 
imagine how Elonis could have believed it would be 
interpreted as anything but a threat. 
 
Second, Elonis contends the fact that his statements 
were in lyric form suggests he did not know they would be 
regarded as threats.  The evidence suggests otherwise.  This 
was not the first time Elonis used a lyric form to post 
threatening statements.  He previously posted statements 
about Dorney Park on October 19 and 22 with a lyric form 
similar to his post about the police.  But despite the use of a 
lyric form, several of Elonis’s coworkers at Dorney Park 
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regarded the posts as threatening, and Elonis was aware of 
their fears.  He knew that his use of a lyric form did not lessen 
the threatening nature of his posts.  His continued use of the 
form only heightens the likelihood he knew a reasonable 
person would interpret his post as a threat. 
 
Third, Elonis contends the fact he communicated his 
statements on Facebook— which he claims is “a medium that 
magnifies the potential for disconnect between the speaker’s 
intent and the audience’s understanding”—suggests he did 
not know his statements would be regarded as threats.  But 
whatever disconnect there may have been surely disappeared 
when Elonis read his coworkers’ posts about how they felt 
threatened, and when he discovered his ex-wife was seeking a 
restraining order against him.  By the time he made his 
statement regarding the police, he was clearly aware of how 
his audience would understand it.  His Facebook post was 
written either with the purpose to threaten the police, or with 
knowledge that the post would be interpreted as a threat. 
 
3. 
Count Four of the indictment charged Elonis with 
violating Section 875(c) by communicating a threat to injure a 
kindergarten class of elementary school children.  The 
Facebook post that formed the basis for this charge states: 
 
That’s it, I’ve had about enough 
I’m checking out and making a name for 
myself 
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius 




And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a 
kindergarten class 
The only question is . . . which one? 
As with the other counts, Elonis contends the jury may not 
have convicted him of this count were it required to find he 
knew the post would be threatening to a reasonable person.  
We disagree. 
 
 Elonis’s post is graphic and specific in ways that make 
it impossible to believe he was unaware it would be 
interpreted as a threat.  He specifically threatens elementary 
schools in a ten-mile radius, narrows his threat further to 
kindergarten classes within those elementary schools, and 
ends his post with a haunting question that suggests he will 
carry out his threat imminently.  Given the understandable 
sensitivity regarding school shootings in this country, of 
which Elonis was no doubt aware, no rational juror could 
conclude that Elonis did not have the purpose to threaten, or 
did not know that a reasonable person would feel threatened, 
when he said he would “initiate the most heinous school 





Finally, Count Five of the indictment charged Elonis 
with violating Section 875(c) by communicating a threat to 
injure an FBI agent.  As with the other counts, the jury 
convicted Elonis under an objective standard, finding that the 
Facebook post about the FBI agent would be regarded as 
threatening by a reasonable person. 
 
  The post forming the basis for Count Five stated, 
referring to the FBI agent that visited Elonis’s house earlier in 
the day, “Little Agent Lady stood so close / Took all the 
strength I had not to turn the b**** ghost / Pull my knife, 
flick my wrist, and slit her throat / Leave her bleedin’ from 
her jugular in the arms of her partner.”  The post further 
stated that if the FBI returned, he would detonate an explosive 
device he had strapped to his body. 
 
 Elonis once more contends the jury may not have 
convicted him of threatening the FBI agent had it not been 
erroneously instructed under an objective standard.  Once 
again, we disagree.  By the time the FBI visited Elonis on 
November 30, he knew his former coworkers felt threatened 
by his posts.  The chief of patrol at Dorney Park, a friend of 
Elonis’s on Facebook, felt so threatened that he enhanced 
park security, informed the local police, and notified the FBI.  
Elonis knew his ex-wife felt threatened enough by his posts to 
take out a restraining order against him.  And when FBI 
agents showed up at his door, Elonis knew his followers on 
Facebook felt threatened enough to contact the FBI, and the 
FBI took those concerns seriously.  Despite that knowledge, 
Elonis posted yet another violent message, this time about 
one of the FBI agents that visited him.  The evidence 
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overwhelmingly demonstrates Elonis knew how this post 
would be interpreted.  No rational juror could have found 
Elonis did not have the purpose of threatening FBI agents or 




Our disposition on the issue of harmless error decides 
this case.  Accordingly, we have no occasion to determine 
whether a finding of recklessness would be sufficient to 
satisfy the mental state requirement of Section 875(c).  We 
will leave that question for another day. 
 
IV. 
 Based on our review of the record, we conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Elonis would have been 
convicted if the jury had been properly instructed.  We 
therefore hold that the error was harmless, and uphold his 
conviction. 
